Friday, October 1, 2021

Security matters: G20 Foreign Ministers meet on Afghanistan

On September 22 2021, the Foreign Ministers of the G20 under the chairmanship of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs Luigi Di Maio, convened for a virtual gathering given the ongoing complications of the pandemic for in-person summitry. Sixteen ministers were present (including the US, France, Germany, the UK, China and India) as well as UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres.

While Zoom-plomacy may still be taking its odd first steps as a new normal in international relations, something else occurred at that gathering which made it stand out: the raison d’être of the summit was an exchange of ideas between G20 member nations on Afghanistan, given the recent US withdrawal, the return of the Taliban and the overall potential threat it poses for global security, which certainly concern NATO allies, but also other G20 members like Turkey, Russia, India and China, who now have to deal with a new geopolitical wildcard in their very backyards.

The Afghanistan discussion at the gathering stood out, because since its inception under Mexican auspices in 2012, the Foreign Ministers’ G20 has carefully sidestepped “hard” global security issues - leaving them in the purview of the G7 - focusing instead on less contentious issues involving broad multilateralism and cooperation, with the notable exception of the 2013 St. Petersburg summit, where Russia stepped up in an impromptu yet welcomed fashion with an emergency proposal to broker the Syrian chemical weapons stocks’ disarmament to avoid a Western-led strike, after the Assad regime crossed the Obama “red line.”

This time around, the G20 Foreign Ministers’ security matters agenda, while a bit circumstantial, appears more deliberate, and signals that we truly now are firmly footed in a multipolar new world order, for the first time in almost a century. It took root progressively in many ways, over the last decade.

In rather explicit ways, Russia and China have become eager to assert their authorities within what they see as their close spheres of influence, like in Crimea, Eastern Europe or in Hong Kong or around the South China Sea, and as the new brokers in the Middle East and Asia, all while Western countries became embattled in endless wars and nation-building efforts with limited impacts and extremely high human, financial and political costs.

In response, just recently, we have seen the new AUKUS alliance emerge on the far eastern horizon between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.

Even middle powers are putting their chips in the game. Back in 2010, Turkey and Brazil attempted to independently broker a deal with Iran over its nuclear operations, and we are also seeing the members of the very diverse “G4” (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) whose main common goals are permanent seats for themselves on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), coming up with a range of initiatives on their own, on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

All the aforementioned countries (except for Iran) are G20 members. And while regional and interests-based alliances are in the natural order of diplomacy and must be allowed to be, the G20’s chief diplomats must not forget that they are part of a broader framework in which the actions of one country ripple in all others, and will affect them in the end too. It is in that spirit that the G20 Foreign Ministers’ group should continue exploring a progressive adoption of a security agenda, and eventually formalize its foray in matters of war and peace.

In that very spirit, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono suggested in 2018 that the G20 Foreign Ministers gathering might eventually constitute a good venue in the future for head diplomats to smooth out global security issues.

He is not alone in thinking so. Just recently, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that he was hoping the G20 Foreign Ministers’ could play a “constructive role” on Afghanistan. For China, finding itself under increasing international pressure, it likely sees that forum as a place to discuss and spar on equal footing among peers, somewhat removed from the direct pressure of leaders, where it can advance and possibly negotiate its priorities among competing interests, as opposed to the G7 where it does not hold a seat.

Watchers, diplomats and academics may point out that a lack of traditional joint communiqué at the conclusion of the September 22 meeting means a lack of consensus, and then bring into question the relevance of the gathering. 

In response, one could argue that the fact that the Afghanistan discussion was even held between G20 members is significant. For over a decade, the repetitive G7 Foreign Ministers’ communiqués and their lofty goals have had a generally limited impact on global security matters. In Israel-Palestine, in Syria, in Crimea, in Iran, in North Korea and as it happens, in Afghanistan, facts on the ground did not change much because the G7’s chief diplomats expressed their ongoing concerns or encouragement.

While it is true that the G20 Foreign Ministers did not issue a communiqué after the virtual meeting, the group should not be demeaned for it. Significant differences on policies and interests exist on ongoing geopolitical matters. But the venue exists. The ministers met. The discussion was held. And that is not insignificant.

For nearly two years now, the COVID-19 pandemic has put the entire world in a state of shock. Fragile states, shuttered business, vulnerable people and a changing climate are severely mortgaging the physical and metaphysical world order and the institutions which support it. The potential for signalling failure and catastrophic errors, as emerging nations compete to fill the new regional power vacua, is high. 

It is therefore sensible that every venue for communication and cooperation, as imperfect or unorthodox as it may be, must be encouraged. As a venture, an arm’s length removed from its leaders in an era of managed democracy and trendy authoritarianism, a flexible G20 Foreign Ministers forum can be a force to be reckoned with, even virtually through a seemingly inane quick group call on Zoom.

As such, it holds much promise, and it is not unlike the Concert of Europe in the post-Napoleonic world which helped keep a relative peace in multipolar Europe between 1814 and 1914. A century after that fact, a G20 Foreign Ministers’ group could help steer and infuse the UNSC with political leadership, as well as the technical, cooperation organizations and agencies which work to ensure relative peace and security worldwide.

Come next year, it will be interesting to see if the next G20 host, Indonesia, at a crossroads hub in the Indo-Pacific, deems it in its interest to pursue and broaden the security discussion in the G20, as China mobilizes allies and rivals alike in its ascent and assertiveness.

Western nations may have legitimate gripes in having to deal with authoritarians or strongmen regimes. However, the fact remains that in this day and age, peace and stability in rough geopolitical neighbourhoods are not likely to be achieved in a consensus built between friends, allies and democrats half a world away, but rather between competing, rival, even enemy nations.

The new world is here. It is odd, unexpected, unforeseen and unpredictable. In attempting to find workable configurations, the G20 nations, their governments and their head diplomats must strive to make the most of it, for global peace and stability is in the interest of all.